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REsTITUTION-llNJUST ENRICHMENT-Plaintiff brought an action of assumpsit against defendant national bank on a theory of unjust enrichment.
Plaintiff and plaintiff's father were two of the nine directors of defendant bank
when the bank holiday was declared in 1933. As a condition to reopening,
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the Comptroller of the Currency required that unconditional contributions be
made to undivided profits in the amount of $32,000. Each director agreed to
advance a one-ninth part, with the understanding among themselves that
repayment would be made when the bank was able to do so. With the knowledge of the other directors, plaintiff advanced his own share and the major
part of his father's. Permission was secured from the Comptroller in 1947 to
refund the sums advanced in 1933. Plaintiff was not a member of the board
when the repayment was approved, and his father had died years earlier. Plaintiff received his aliquot contribution, but the bank refused to repay the sum
paid toward the father's share, claiming a right to apply it against a note
allegedly guaranteed by the father, though no such agreement existed with the
plaintiff. On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, held, affirmed. A cause of
action grounded on unjust enrichment arose upon the repayment to the other
directors, and obtained in spite of the absence of any contract, express or implied,
that repayment would be made. Binns v. First National Bank of California,
367 Pa. 359, 80 A. (2d) 768 (1951).
The court in the principal case has found unjust enrichment in a failure to
repay an unconditional contribution by a party who seemingly acted as a "volunteer." As further showing of the voluntary nature of the directors' action, a
search of the United States Code reveals no duty existing upon directors of
national banks to contribute to the undivided profits account, unless it is fairly
implied that their interest was a self-serving one as substantial stockholders
of the bank. The directors may well have been looking apprehensively toward
the double liability imposed on stockholders in the event of failure of the bank,1
but since their contributions were not in proportion to shares held by them,
and no special assessment had been declared, such a conclusion is merely conjectural. If it is assumed that the payments were made under a duty as stockholders, the case for unjust enrichment would be greatly weakened. From
the facts, therefore, there is good reason for holding that the directors were
simply "volunteers." The Restitution Restatement concludes that persons who
have been unjustly enriched at the expense of another are required to make
restitution to the other; further that such persons are enriched if they have
received a benefit, liability for which attaches only if the retention would be
unjust as between the parties. 2 Although the Restatement implies that unjust
enrichment alone will ground restitution, the cases cited by the Permanen!
Edition3 and the decisions of courts generally4 would require unjust enrichment "plus." Even though enrichment may be clear and its retention unexplainable by valid contract or other legal transaction or by any overriding social policy,
1 12 U.S.C. (1946) §§63, 64 and 64(a). Sec. 64(a) repealed double liability as to
shares issued after a certain specified date and as to all others by advertising for six months,
but this provision took effect after the present case arose.
2 RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, c. I, §§la, b, and c (1936).
3 REsTATEMENT IN THE CotmTs, Perm. Ed., 578 (1945).
4 See IO PERMANENT A.LR. DxcEsT, Restitution; unjust enrichment §6(3) (1950); 12
AM. Jtm., Quasi Contracts or Contracts Implied in Law §6 (1938); 12 AM. Jun., Contracts, Acceptance of Performance as Basis for Implied Promise §352 (1938).
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remedy will be denied where the required "plus" is absent, the courts declaring
that the plaintiff is a "volunteer" or "officious intermeddler." The "plus" element is usually found in public interest or self interest adequate to justify the
action of the plaintiff. Situations where this additional factor will be found are
not limitless.5 The enrichment which occurred in the principal case was held
to be sufficient to support recovery even though there existed no implied contract or any convincing reason beyond the pure definition of the Restatement.6
A possible analogy is that of gifts made in contemplation of marriage. Although
the theories of recovery range from mistake of fact, 7 rescission and restitution,
and quasi-contract8 to conditional gift, the last is the most commonly applied. 9
Since the principal case found no contract, express or implied, the conditional
gift .theory warrants analysis. Certainly in the marriage cases the condition
of the gift is an imaginary "plus" read in to found an action for unjust enrichment. It might in a like manner be interpreted that the directors in the
principal case made such a condition inherent in their contribution. The gift
in contemplation of marriage by a third person not a party to the marriage
is particularly10 similar to our present situation if we eliminate the element of
the directors being stockholders. This third party feature makes the argument
of rescission and restitution and quasi-contract impossible, for the plaintiffs
are not involved in any contract presently or to be made, leaving the conditional
gift as the final alternative. The principal case might, therefore, have found
the additional "plus" in an implied condition, were it not for the single factor,
however, that the Comptroller required unconditional contributions. A fair
conclusion seems to be that the principal case stands alone as an anomaly, all
•5

46

AM.

Jun., Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, p. 99 (1943).

6 REsnnrrroN REsTATEMBNT, c. I, §la. (1936). The court confided in the princi-

pal case that there were no comparable cases to support their conclusion, and certainly they
could find little help from Gordon v. Trimble, 318 Mo. 341, 300 S.W. 475 (1927), and
First National Bank of Arthur, (7th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 623, which they cited at
371-372. The first involved an express agreement to repay sums advanced by notes of the
directors to prevent the closing of the bank, where such express condition was absolute and
in the form of a loan. In the second a special assessment had been made on all stockholders
prior to liquidation, and an amount remained over to be returned to the contributors. It was
held that those who had contributed more than others should be paid this excess amount
before any others were paid, rather than in proportion to contributions. The duty to return
the surplus to the stockholders arose from the United States Code and ouly the distributory
scheme was in the hands of the court, though it described its decision as "just and equitable."
Therefore, neither case turned on unjust enrichment per se, and even if they had, the required "plus" would seem to be present.
7 38 CALIF. L. Rav. 529 at 534 (1950), where the author said, ''Were it not that
courts have traditionally declined to consider a future relationship as a 'fact,' a sounder
theory for third party donors would be mistake of fact."
s 29 CoRN. L. Q. 401 at 404 (1944), in which the author summarized, "In the last
analysis, recovery of an engagement ring or other property transferred in contemplation of
marriage rests upon a quasi-contractual basis, even though the court chooses to rationalize its
holding in terms of conditional gift or of rescission of the contract to marry."
9 18 MINN. L. Rav. 478-479 (1934).
10 Harry Grossman v. Garrison S. Greenstein, 161 Md. 71, 155 A. 190 (1931).
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the established grounds for recovery having failed of analysis and leaving unjust enrichment as the sole basis for remedy. 11
Robert L. Sandblom, S.Ed.

11

37 KY. L.

J.

113 (1948).

